Xinjiang cotton encountered "open shot" and "dark war"

In a cold March, Xinjiang cotton is in the hot seat.

On March 24, 2021, Swedish fast-fashion brand H&M came under heavy public "fire" on Chinese social media platforms. In a statement posted on its website, the company said it was no longer sourcing cotton from Xinjiang. Subsequently, H&M's business partners in the Chinese entertainment industry, such as actors Huang Xuan and Song Xi, announced that they were "cutting ties" with H&M. As of March 25, Taobao, Jingdong, Jindo and other e-commerce giants have blocked or taken down H&M's online stores and related products. And the incident continues to fester, with more brands involved.

In the winter of 2020, the Southern Weekend reporter had field visits to Xinjiang north and south, in-depth interviews with cotton farms, ginners, cotton seed companies, garment factories and other cotton supply chain enterprises, etc.. Many Xinjiang cotton enterprises are in deep trouble, and behind the plight, is a "dark war" around the international cotton discourse.

　

"Bad news that fermented for six months"

It is the coldest time of the year, the daytime temperature is also below zero, and the midday sun does not melt the ice in the depression.

Early in the morning, the Uyghur guy buy buyti-alifu drive to the factory to work. A year ago, he finally saved enough money to buy a small car, replaced the broken electric car, "the car is second-hand, only tens of thousands of dollars, with heating."

The company's main business is to provide a wide range of products and services to the market. "There are 30 mu of land at home, and I used to help my parents at home to do farm work and work short hours during farming. Now the contract with the factory is signed once a year, the average monthly salary is 4,000 yuan, social security is complete, and the income is guaranteed."

One day in December 2020, buy buy buy in the factory driving forklifts, handling lint cotton. The de-seeded cotton was compacted and packed into bales, each with hundreds of kilograms. The boss, Zhang Biao, saw it and admonished, "Slow down and pay attention to safety. Buybaiti felt that the young boss, who was only a few years older than himself, was "not bad", and he wanted to continue to work in the new year.

Buyer does not know is that his hometown and occupy 80% of China's cotton production in Xinjiang cotton, is caught in a whirlwind of public opinion.

Buybaiti's boss Zhang Biao sitting in his office, his face is difficult. Inside the factory, workers neatly labeled the ginned bales of cotton, neatly placed in a pile. Not far away, from the cotton farmers to buy the seed cotton is piled up in the open yard, towering a "cotton mountain".

Zhang Biao is the owner of Xinjiang Yuli County Hope Textile Co. Into December, the acquisition of cotton in Xinjiang has ended, the major ginners have opened lint sales. However, the consistent popularity of Xinjiang long-staple cotton, the sales of 2020 is not optimistic.

"In October 2020, the company has been cooperating with the Swiss Good Cotton Development Association (hereinafter referred to as "BCI") suddenly sent a notice of termination of contract, to this year's lint sales have brought a certain impact."

Zhang Biao is a "post-90s". After graduating from college, he did not stay in a provincial capital city on the east coast, but returned to Yuli County, took over the family built in the 1990s cotton mill.

"We buy seed cotton from cotton farmers, then process it into lint and sell it downstream." Zhang Biao said that the acquisition of seed cotton is often tens of thousands of tons, the investment capital cost of tens of millions of yuan. If there is no stable cooperative customers, or encounter price fluctuations in the year, it is easy to cause large losses.

In 2015, Zhang Biao mobilized hundreds of farmers to set up the "Zongwang Cotton Growers Cooperative", which then became the executive partner of BCI. BCI also regularly sends its staff to the partners for acceptance reviews.

BCI is an international non-profit membership organization whose members rank among the top in the world in terms of cotton supply and procurement. The "Sustainable Cotton Production Standard" is currently the key access standard in the international textile distribution trade. In addition to BCI, Australia, Brazil, India and other major cotton producing countries have also developed their own standards, while this standard is still a gap in China.

BCI certified cotton, the market recognition is higher. Zhang Biao also said, "compared with ordinary cotton, with BCI certification, the price per ton is tens to hundreds of dollars higher. Moreover, traders and yarn mills downstream of the cotton industry are also BCI members, and joining them can make friends and expand business."

BCI China staff Liu Zhi said that there are many international standards for sustainable cotton, and BCI's advantage is that there are both systematic standards for sustainable cotton judging and a huge amount of cotton production. Today, the BCI thousands of members around the world, and a variety of types, covering the upstream and downstream cotton textile industry chain.

Every year from March, cotton farmers in Xinjiang start their cotton planting work. According to the usual practice, Zhang Biao also has to report the cotton field data. However, in March 2020, Zhang Biao unexpectedly received a "suspension of certification" email from BCI.

According to the email, "In view of the complexities of the current international environment, the BCI Board of Directors has finally decided to suspend the certification program and certificates in Xinjiang, China, for the period 2020-2021. At the same time, BCI will use this time to further upgrade and optimize the standards to cope with the complex and changing external environment."

In the following six months, Zhang Biao found that BCI's many activities in Xinjiang did not stop, and he continued to report relevant data in accordance with BCI's requirements and to communicate with BCI's counterpart in South Xinjiang about the progress of things. "At that time, I just thought that the certification was suspended for one year, and I still had expectations for future cooperation." Zhang Biao said.

Six months later, the bad news still came.

In October 2020, Zhang Biao received an email from BCI's China office staff. It read, "In view of the current complications regarding the upgrade work of the Good Cotton Standard system, BCI has decided to temporarily terminate the implementation of the partnership agreement at this time."

"The previous email said 'suspend the certification for 2020-2021', while this one said 'temporarily terminate'. It feels like instead of getting better, the situation has further deteriorated." Zhang Biao said.

"The decision came from the Swiss headquarters."

　　

Weeks after the "termination of cooperation" email was sent, BCI unveiled the mystery.

On October 21, 2020, BCI's Swiss headquarters released a statement on its website saying that BCI had stopped issuing certificates for cotton in China's Xinjiang region since March 2020, and fully terminated its cooperation in October.

The statement noted that "ongoing allegations of forced labor and other human rights violations in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region have created an increasingly untenable operating environment. As a result, BCI has decided to immediately cease all field activities in the region, including capacity building and data monitoring and reporting."

In another public statement on December 18, 2020, BCI's Swiss headquarters stated, "Researchers have identified a growing risk of forced labor at the farm level in the ...... Xinjiang region."

Faced with the allegations, many people, including employees in China, were puzzled: why did BCI Switzerland headquarters issue such a statement?

BCI China employee Liu Zhi told the Southern Weekend reporter that currently BCI has more than ten implementation partners in Xinjiang, China, such as Bole, Kulle and Aksu. In mid-2020, BCI China had sent personnel to Xinjiang for research in many places. "This research did not cover all (partners), but selected a few of them. According to the information I learned, the visit did not find any forced labor in the companies concerned." Liu Zhi said.

Li Chengjun, general manager of Bazhou (Bayingoleng Mongol Autonomous Prefecture) Taichang Agricultural Development Co., Ltd, also confirmed to Southern Weekend that a number of BCI China staff arrived at Taichang Industry in May 2020 for a 2-day research, asking about the factory's operation and labor situation. "There was no unpleasant experience at that time, and no feedback was received later that the farm was found to be in violation of BCI regulations." Li Chengjun recalled.

In fact, as early as the company's first cooperation with BCI, Zhang Biao realized that the use of labor is an important item in BCI's assessment of cotton enterprises. since 2020, the BCI side has also asked cotton farmers to take photos and videos of the planting process to prove that it meets BCI's requirements in the production process. In Zhang Biao's view, "we began to accept the certification in 2015, during which there have been no problems. Why is it that there is a problem in 2020? The so-called problems found in the investigation, I feel it is false."

On March 1, 2021, the BCI Shanghai Representative Office issued a statement on its official WeChat public number, stating that it had recently received letters of inquiry from some of its previous implementation partners in Xinjiang, and that the BCI China project team had strictly followed BCI's audit principles and had never found a single case of forced labor in the second-party credibility audits and third-party verifications performed at the Xinjiang project site since 2012. The statement also shows that the BCI China project team has been working closely with the BCI Shanghai office.

The statement also indicates that BCI Shanghai will continue to communicate with Xinjiang implementation partners to maintain a sustainable supply chain.

How BCI's Swiss headquarters came to the conclusion that there was a "risk of forced labor" remains a mystery. However, BCI suspended cooperation on the adverse impact of Xinjiang cotton has already appeared.

(hereinafter referred to as "Haoxing Cotton & Sisal") is located in Bole City, Xinjiang Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, with eight cotton farms under its name and an annual lint processing volume of about 100,000 tons. The company joined BCI in 2013 and has been working with the latter for seven years.

"Because BCI discontinued the cooperation, our company's lint cotton in 2020 was not sold well, and the price and sales path were affected." Haoxing cotton and linen business manager Gao Ruinan told the Southern Weekend reporter that by the end of December 2020, the company had only sold an estimated 10,000-20,000 tons of lint cotton. And with reference to the sales volume in recent years, the regular standard should be 30-40,000 tons. "Now we roughly estimate a loss of more than 14 million yuan, about a third of the annual profit."

Panic is also spreading downstream in the industry chain.

Gao Rui Nan said that its company cooperation customers, there are many traders engaged in the import and export of cotton textiles. After learning that Xinjiang cotton was BCI "delisting certification", cooperation enterprises "everyone is in danger". In order to protect export orders, some companies can only stop cooperating with Xinjiang enterprises, and through a large number of procurement of cotton enterprises outside the border or the United States, Australia, Pakistan and other places of imported cotton to solve the problem of raw material supply.

Zhang Biao, on the other hand, said that the company's business was not too affected by this in 2020, but the future impact is difficult to assess. "Our cooperative previously promoted the area and farmers will not be able to get permission. This also means that the cotton we produce cannot go through BCI's channels to be distributed. And the related buyers or yarn mills that we used to have cooperation with can't use the raw materials we supply."

Disappearing workers in the cotton fields

For "forced labor", many Xinjiang cotton people feel aggrieved.

"Cotton planting labor is mainly in the picking process. In the past, few employment opportunities, picking cotton has become a side business for farmers to make money."

Xinjiang Taichang farm general manager Li Chengjun is a senior "cotton people", experienced the whole process from farm preparation to mechanization. He is located in Xinjiang Yuli County, Taichang Industrial Co., Ltd. was first created in 1994. Currently, the company's farm cultivation of cotton area of about 65,000 mu, ginning plant annual output of 10,000 tons of lint.

In the 1990s, the labor cost of recruiting flower pickers for the farm was about 0.6 yuan/kg. Whenever the cotton harvest time, from Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, Henan and other places "flower picking army" will enter Xinjiang.

According to Li Chengjun, around 2003, Yuli County hand-picked cotton labor price exceeded 2 yuan / kg. The average amount of flowers picked by the average person a day in 80-100 kg, a total of RMB 200-300 yuan / day. "A good job can pick 150 kilograms a day and earn tens of thousands of dollars a month."

In recent years, the mechanization of cotton production in Xinjiang has accelerated, whether it is land management, cotton planting, or cotton picking and other links, the number of personnel using labor has been greatly reduced. Every harvest time, the vast Xinjiang cotton fields, from all over the country, "picking army" has retired from the historical stage, replaced by professional and efficient mechanized operations.

Compared to the earlier mechanization of the northern border, the southern border farms to open the "cotton picker" era is late.

"In 2015, our farm has a peak season recruitment difficulties, there is a price without a market. So, we also began to try machine picking." According to Li Chengjun, Taichang Farm tried machine harvesting for the first time in 2016, reaching 40% machine picking rate, followed by yearly increases. By the cotton picking season in 2020, the farm machine harvesting rate basically reached 95%. "In the past, growing cotton relied mainly on people, but now it relies on machines."

In the recruitment of personnel, a number of cotton enterprises responsible for the Southern Weekend reporter said that the company and employees are voluntary labor contracts or employment agreements, personnel are mostly from the open labor market, nearby villagers, as well as foreign workers, etc., the treatment is based on long-term workers and temporary workers in the peak season to pay different salaries.

Taking Taichang Farm as an example, Li Chengjun said that the farm has been established for more than 20 years and has accumulated a good reputation in terms of employment. During the busy season, there are people who call specifically to consult whether to use the labor; there are also people who mobilize relatives and friends to come together, which has formed a relatively fixed labor channel.

Whether 10,000 acres of large farms, or dozens of acres of small farmers, Xinjiang cotton fields mechanized picking has become an unstoppable trend. Zhang Biao said that in the three years from 2018-2020, the company acquired cotton, the proportion of machine-picked cotton is rapidly increasing. "In these three years, the proportion of machine-picked and hand-picked is thirty-seven, fifty-five and ninety-one, respectively."

From the upstream cotton seeds, to the downstream of the yarn factory, Xinjiang cotton production and processing chain of various links, are actively adapting to the trend of machine picking. Xinjiang Guoxin Seed Co., Ltd. quality inspection department director Wang Hongzhe told the Southern Weekend reporter, in recent years, cotton farmers in the purchase of seeds, more inclined to buy seedlings suitable for mechanized operations.

"Now cotton farmers in the selection of seeds, will ask whether the cotton seeds are suitable for machine harvesting. For example, like fruiting branch nodes high, compact seeds are more popular. Practice has also proved that the sales of such seeds in the southern border is also good." Wang Hongzhe said.

Several years ago, many textile mills in Xinjiang are not very acceptable machine picked cotton. Because compared to hand-picked cotton, machine-picked cotton has more impurities, less yarn output and low weaving rate. "However, now textile mills also welcome machine picked cotton. Because of the low cost of machine picking, in the price of cotton is too advantageous, forcing yarn mills to improve the process." Zhang Biao said.

As the northern border cotton enterprises, Hao Xing cotton business manager Gao Rui Nan said, for example, each mu of land produces about 400 kg of cotton, the current machine picking costs only 100 yuan. If it is manually picked, the cost per mu up to 800 blocks, not including the cost of food and housing for labor. "Machine picking high efficiency and low cost, why use artificial? Now in the northern border cotton fields, sometimes people are rarely seen." Gao Rui Nan said.

Posting job advertisement and research report

　　

The accusations of "forced labor" in Xinjiang's cotton textile industry did not start with BCI, but were preceded by numerous statements and "investigation reports" published by institutions or media in Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom.

In a statement released by BCI's Swiss headquarters on December 18, 2020, a report from the CENTER FOR GLOBAL POLICY in Washington, D.C., was cited. The report's author, Adrian Zenz, has been described by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman as "the backbone of an anti-China research organization set up by manipulated U.S. intelligence agencies.

The report, entitled "Labor Migration and Mobilization of Ethnic Minorities to Pick Flowers in Xinjiang," states that "more than 500,000 ethnic minority workers are deployed each year to participate in seasonal cotton picking, and their working conditions can be highly coercive."

At the same time, the report questions efforts to combat poverty in China's Xinjiang region.

For example, "grassroots government training for workers" is seen as "forced labor," "encouraging villagers to work hard and get rich" is seen as "propaganda and brainwashing," and "one-stop labor use" is seen as "a way to get rich. The "one-stop employment service" is regarded as "close surveillance", and "centralized childcare for workers" is regarded as "slavery education". "slavery education". However, the report is silent on the evidence of pay, an important factor in distinguishing "forced labor.

Similar "academic reports" or "human rights reports" on the Xinjiang region are not rare.

On March 1, 2020, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), an Australian think tank, released the study Trafficking in Uighurs: "Re-education," Forced Labor, and Surveillance Outside Xinjiang. The report alleges forced labor in the Xinjiang region and, in a rare move, lists "foreign and Chinese companies that may be involved in forced labor, either intentionally or unintentionally.

As the report shows, it draws its data from "publicly available Chinese documents, satellite image analysis, academic research and media reports from the field.

The Southern Weekend reporter traced the content of the report to its source and found that there were many misinterpretations.

For example, the report states that "multiple sources indicate that many Uighur workers in factories across China live harsh, segregated lives under so-called 'militarized management'." The conclusion cites a job advertisement on the Chinese social media platform "Baidu Post." The ad reads in Chinese, "Contracts start at one year! ...... Semi-military management, able to bear hardships, no loss of staff, contract for as long as you can work! In the real context of China, such online recruitment advertisements do not have enough authority and authenticity.

For example, the report cites a news report titled "Let the seeds of ethnic unity be rooted in the heart - a side story of the Municipal Women's Federation's sincere care for minority women workers". The original report shows, "Over the years, Tai Guang Women's Federation has carried out psychological guidance services for Uyghur female workers through contacting members of the Women's Federation in groups with Uyghur female workers and carrying out visits, ...... setting up psychological guidance rooms and talk rooms, etc." This report has been interpreted as "evidence that workers' thoughts and behaviors are closely monitored within the factory."

In recent years, these uncritical and even biased "academic reports" have become the source of data cited by some Western media and organizations, which in turn has been widely disseminated.

On December 15, 2020, the BBC released a video report citing data from the above-mentioned report, saying that there may be forced labor in Xinjiang cotton enterprises. At the same time, the report stated that a BBC reporter was stopped from interviewing at Xinjiang Kucha Pomegranate Seed Apparel Co. From the video footage, the factory is surrounded by high walls and seems to be full of secrets.

Southern Weekend reporter visited the company and found that it is a normal operating garment processing factory. Ouyang Zhijun, the person in charge of the pomegranate seed apparel company, introduced to the Southern Weekend reporter that the company was set up on March 25, 2020, and currently there are three factory buildings in the factory, including a garment factory, a bag factory and a shoe factory. Workers are mostly openly recruited after job advertisements are issued in the townships.

"In the garment factory, for example, after the workers are recruited, we will train them. During the training period they have a guaranteed salary of 1,540 yuan per month. After being formally accepted by the factory, we will sign formal labor contracts with the employees." Ouyang Zhijun introduced.

He showed the labor contract and quit slip of the employees to the Southern Weekend reporter. According to him, the factory has had a high turnover of employees since its establishment. "Because our employees are recruited from rural areas. Farmers who come to the factory to learn technology definitely need an adaptation process. After training, those who are suitable will stay; those who are not, we will return the workers."

Gulnisanmu Nurdon is a native of Yuchigustang Township, Kucha City. She entered Garnet Seed Garment Company in April 2020. After training has mastered the garment-making process, and in just a few months became a workshop team leader from an ordinary female worker.

"I have been taking care of the elderly and children at home after I got married. in April 2020, my husband inquired about a new garment factory opening here and encouraged me to give it a try." Gulnisanmu Nurdon said she lives and eats in the factory on weekdays and has a 1½-hour lunch break at noon every day. On weekends, she takes the bus home, which takes about half an hour on the way. "The standard of living has improved significantly after one more person in the family earned money. The current life is very agreeable, and next, my goal is to become an instructor on the factory floor."

The "dark war" in cotton

Why this time Xinjiang cotton suffered BCI "delisting"?

The BCI's highest authority is the BCI General Assembly, which elects the Board of Directors to handle the day-to-day work. 20 January 2021, the Southern Weekend reporter saw from the BCI headquarters website, the current BCI Board of Directors has a total of 11 members, and two independent board members. Most of these companies or institutions are from India, Pakistan, Australia, the United States and other countries, none of them are "Chinese".

Currently, the BCI Board is chaired by Marc Lewkowitz, who is also the president and CEO of SUPIMA, a U.S. company that operates and promotes PIMA Cotton, a high-quality U.S. cotton that competes to some degree with Chinese cotton from Xinjiang. There is a degree of market competition with Xinjiang cotton in China.

In addition, three European and American retailer brands are also on the board: the British retail brand Marks and Spencer, the Swedish apparel brand H&M (Hennes & Mauritz), and the American denim brand Levi Strauss & Co.

At present, among the thousands of global members of BCI, Chinese members are mainly concentrated in the middle and upper reaches of the industry chain, mostly cotton farmers, ginners, yarn mills and so on. There are only two Chinese members in the brand name category, namely Anta and Baby Li.

The listed company Anta Sports (02020) disclosed in its 2019 earnings report that it became a member of the BCI in 2019, making it the first Chinese sporting goods company to join the BCI. In August 2020, the Shanghai-based baby products company "LiBaoFang" also announced that it would join BCI and commit to sourcing 60% of "more sustainable cotton" by 2024.

In the BCI construction of cotton ecology, Chinese companies and European and American companies do not have equal rights to speak. The natural advantage of the brands downstream of the chain, who control the procurement volume, further depresses the "scales" of the Chinese side.

"In addition to very tight years, most of the time the cotton market is a buyer's market." Zhang Biao said that many international cotton brands will use BCI sustainable cotton as a "highlight", and the supply chain traceability. If the raw material is not sustainable cotton, the brand will refuse to buy.

"So, if you want to work with big brands in Europe and the United States, you must get the BCI sustainable cotton quota. In order to get the certification, you must listen to BCI to plant. Conversely, if you do not work with BCI, not only cotton farmers can not sell a good price, even yarn mills, fabric mills, garment factories, etc. also have to weigh the pros and cons, which in turn causes the entire cotton industry chain will be affected." Zhang Biao said.

Since 2020, Nike, H&M, Adidas and many other European and American apparel brands have publicly boycotted Xinjiang cotton.

Swedish FMCG brand H&M mentioned in a statement on its official website, "Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is the largest cotton-growing region in China, and so far our suppliers have been sourcing cotton from BCI-related farms in the region. And BCI's decision to suspend its BCI cotton license in XUAR means that 'for our production, the suppliers we work with will not source BCI cotton from XUAR' ."

U.S. brand Nike also issued a statement in March 2020 that it does not source products from XUAR and has confirmed with its contract suppliers that it does not use textiles or spun yarns from XUAR. In addition, Nike said that it has stopped hiring new employees from the Xinjiang region at its factory in Qingdao, China, and that the factory will no longer have any Xinjiang employees.

Europe and the United States brands of public "cut seat", so that Chinese cotton textile trade enterprises face a "dilemma".

A person in charge of the company, who did not want to be named, said, "Many brands know that my business and the entire Xinjiang does not exist forced labor. But due to pressure, they have to draw a line with us and refuse to use our company's raw materials, causing huge losses to the company's revenue." And, "The economic loss is only superficial, the loss of the brand is even more immeasurable."

Cotton enterprises call for self-built standards

After this matter, a number of cotton enterprises in Xinjiang, China should establish its own sustainable cotton norms.

In the cotton industry chain, cotton farmers and farms are located in the most upstream, followed by the processing end, such as ginners, yarn mills; finished products, such as cloth factories, garment factories; sales end, such as traders, cotton retail brands, etc. BCI as one of the sustainable cotton standards initiative, linking the various links upstream and downstream.

A number of cotton enterprises, through the BCI audit, the cotton enterprises in the upper reaches of the annual "sustainable cotton" quota valuation, and then as the cotton into different stages of growth, the data is constantly updated. At harvest time, cotton enterprises in the BCI to provide a trading system, in accordance with the quota value to sell sustainable cotton to downstream enterprises. "The quota value needs to be estimated by BCI's audit, and not all the cotton we produce and process can be certified by BCI." Zhang Biao said.

On the other hand, downstream brand owners purchase certified cotton from BCI member companies and pay corresponding fees to BCI according to the purchase volume. In order to maintain corporate image, large international brands will have certain standards for raw materials. For example, they cannot use child labor, guarantee decent labor for cotton farmers, and guarantee sustainable soil use. Based on the environmental protection and human rights concepts in BCI's sustainable cotton standards, downstream brands often purchase BCI cotton as a company highlight.

"Retail brand owners pay BCI huge membership and sourcing fees, and BCI creates an ecology of sustainable cotton. If there's a problem with cotton, it's not the brand owner's problem, it's BCI not doing a good job of gatekeeping. I think they are protecting each other's relationship." A person in charge of cotton enterprises who did not want to be named commented as such.

Li Jiagang, general manager of Yuli County Zhongliang cotton industry limited liability company, said, "Some of the provisions of the BCI, not suitable for our development, I hope the relevant state departments to take the lead, the organization of industry players to develop a set of China's own standardized production process."

"Taking decent labor as an example, the BCI stipulates 'care for workers, no corporal punishment, no unpaid wages, no child labor' and so on." Zhang Biao believes that although the BCI claims to be a global standard, its requirements are not high. With the current cultivation level of most farms in Xinjiang, the compliance rate is high. "But the standards are set by him, and the power is with the other side. That's why we are constrained."

In July 2020, the U.S. launched the U.S. Cotton Trust Protocol® (UCTP), declaring that "the U.S. Cotton Trust Code will set new standards for sustainable cotton farming in a period of increasing supply chain scrutiny and a growing need for transparency."

Liu Zhi is concerned that once UCTP has gained control of the international cotton textile sector, it will require countries to use the U.S. version of the "certification standard" and "supply chain traceability system. Coupled with the original control of the United States in the field of international sales, the development of China's textile industry will fall into greater passivity.

In fact, the concept of "forced labor" in the formation process, some U.S. media and institutions have been highly concerned.

On December 18, 2018, the Associated Press launched a news report titled "Xinjiang re-education camp forced labor products exported to the United States," which triggered an investigation by U.S. Customs and Border Protection into imports from China.

In March 2019, the Wall Street Journal claimed that BCI member companies have forced labor issues and questioned BCI's credibility.

In January 2020, Fair Labor USA released a special report on "Forced Labor in Xinjiang, China," further asserting that "workers may be sent to factories to work without pay and be forced into labor.

Cao Wei, executive director of the Center for National Security Studies at Lanzhou University's School of Politics and International Relations, pointed out to Southern Weekend that the U.S. focus on "forced labor" or human rights issues in Xinjiang is really a cover.

"Talking about human rights without solving the problem of having enough to eat is a castle in the air. We are now providing training and jobs for our poor Uighur compatriots, but it is being hyped by the West as 'forced labor,' which has caused very bad international influence."

According to Cao Wei, Xinjiang's cotton production is a high percentage of the country's cotton production. If China's exports of textiles, domestic sales of foreign investment, joint venture brands can not use Xinjiang cotton, both to limit the development of the cotton textile industry in Xinjiang, but also the impact of the national cotton textile industry.

The "cotton war" continues to ferment. 2021 March 24, Chinese sportswear brand Anta in the official microblogging statement that Anta has been purchasing and using cotton produced in China's cotton producing areas, including Xinjiang cotton, in the future will also continue to purchase and use Chinese cotton. At the same time the statement also showed that "noting the recent statement issued by BCI and seriously concerned about the matter, we are initiating the relevant procedures to withdraw from the organization."